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CONSENT FOR AMICES FILING
Fhe Utah Trial Lawyers Association ("UTEA") is a statewide organization
comprised of 400 attorneys who are acti\e in defending the rights of tort victims in the
courts and in the legislative arena. Our main focus is to preserve the American justice
svstem and the right to trial by jury. We work to strengthen and deiend laws that protect
Utah families. Our mission is to preserve justice and accountability by upholding the
Constitutions of the FJnited States and the State of Utah, including preserving the rights of
access to the courts, due process, and trial by jury. We seek to advance the cause of those
who are injured in person or properly and who must therefore seek redress: promoting the
fair, prompt and efficient administration of justice: developing and encouraging high
standards of personal and professional conduct among the trial lawyers of Utah: and
promoting excellence and training in the art of advocacy.
Man\' UTEA members have represented plaintiffs in wrongful death actions,
including those stemming from medical malpractice. Accordingly, UTEA has a
significant interest in the outcome of the Court's ruling on this appeal. Furthermore, all
parties in this matter have consented to the appearance of the UTEA as amicus curiae as
required bv Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A Stipulation Consenting
to the Filing of a Brief by the Utah Trial Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae is
attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATCMEN P OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Trial Lawyers Association adopts and incorporates the Statement of
Jurisdiction set forth in the brief of Appellee.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The I Itah Trial Lawyers Association adopts and ineorporaies the Statement of the
Issues Presented on Appeal set forth in lhe brief of Appellee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Trial Lawyers Association adopts and incorporates the Standard of
Review sel forth in the brief of Appellee.
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Cotle Ann. § 7X-14-1 7 (2003 and 2004) are altaehed as Addendum B to the
brief of Utah Medical Association.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 10: [Trial by jury. |
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felon}' cases,
the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other eases, the
Legislature shall esiablish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal case the verdict
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Utah Const. Art. E § 11 [Courts open - - Redress of injuries. |
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this Stale, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const. Art. XVI. § 5 (Injuries resulting in death - - Damages.]
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall
never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
slatutorv limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries
resulting in death is provided for bv law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The I 'tali Trial Lawyers Association adopts and incorporates the Statement of the
Case set forth in the brief of Appellee.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Patients and health care providers do not have equal bargaining power. There is
no reasonable opportunity For a meeting of the minds between a sick patient and her
phvsieian on the terms of an agreement wherein substantive constitutional rights are
purported to be waived. The physician-patient relationship is not about contracts, it is
about health care. Prc-dispute jury trial waivers have no place in the health care setting.
None oF the purported benefits of arbitration, such as it being cheaper, faster, or fairer, are
applicable to agreements between patients and ph\sicians. Procedures in arbitration are
conducted exactlv as they would be in litigation. There is no ev idence. or even a
rationale, for how arbitration of medical malpractice claims in I Hah could be faster,
cheaper, or fairer. If fact, ev idence seems to suggest that the insurance companies, as
"repeat players" in the arbitration business, have advantages over "one-shot*" plaintiffs
that make the arbitration process inherently unfair for injured patients and their families.
The right to a jury trial is a substantive right that cannot be pre-empted by public
policy. Jury trial waivers must be knowing, voluntary' and intelligent. There is no public
policy favoring prc-injury jury trial waivers that do not meet this strict criteria. Mrs.
Bybee was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement and never agreed to waive her
right to a jury trial. Additional!}. Mrs. Bv bee's wrongful death claims did not exist at the
time her husband signed the arbitration agreement and he was powerless to waive her
rights to a jury trial of those claims.
The 2004 amendments to the I Itah I lealth Care Malpractice Act do not provide for
the arbitration of wrongful death claims where the heirs are non-signalories to the
agreement. The sole basis for Mrs. Bybee's claims is not any injur) suffered by her
husband. Her claims are based on her own injuries suffered as a result of .'ner husband's
death. Fhe statute does not provide for the arbitration of such claims, and in fact, the
Etah Constitution protects her right to litigate those claims in court.
Fhe answer to all concerns about arbitration agreements is to allow post-dispute
agreements between the parties. I Jntil a dispute arises it is impossible for either side to
make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision about which dispute resolution
method best suits the facts of the case.
ARGUMENT
I. THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE ABOUT
HEALTH CARE, NOT CONTRACTS.
Defendant's amicus argues that enforcement of the arbitration agreement is
required bv the physician-patient relationship. The argument is that the physician and the
patient contracted to make arbitration part of their relationship, and the family should be
bound bv the patient's decision. This argument ignores the reality of the true physician-
patient relationship.
A. Pro-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers Do Not Belong In The Health Care
Arena Because Doctors And Patients Do Not Have Equal Bargaining
Power.
This Court has stated that "no public policy requires [arbitration] agreements to be
subject to a different analysis when they are between physicians and patients. They are
enforceable if the} meet the standards applicable to all contracts."1 However, the reality
is that pre-dispute jurv- trial waivers entered into between physicians and their patients do
not meet the "standards applicable to all contracts" because virtually all such agreements
are entered into in a procedurally unconscionable manner.
Patients and healthcare providers do not have equal bargaining power. Our society
has put phvsieians on a pedestal. We give them a special title and we give them special
Sosav. Paulos.924 P.2d357. 359 (I Hah 19%;
privileges. Patients do not go to their doctor to discuss and negotiate waivers oi'
substantive constitutional rights. People go to the doctor because the}' are sick and need
help. When a patient is given a stack of papers to sign before being able to see the doctor,
they sign them. He is the doctor, he knows what is best.
Typically, patients do not even see the doctor until after the arbitration agreement
is signed and never have an opportunity to actually bargain with the doctor over the terms
of the agreement. Even if patients want to discuss the terms of the agreement with trie
doctor, they are often not in a position to make any realistic demands. They are like'}'
there in the first place because their insurance limits who the}' can see. If this particular
insurance-approved physician requires an arbitration agreement, they assume all other
approved physicians will require one as well. Additionally, patients are seeing the doctor
in the first place because something is wrong. They need treatment to cure an ill and are
reluctant to do anything that might jeopardize their ability to get timely medical help.
There is a fundamental difference between the physician-patient relationship and
the relationship between other parlies to pre-dispute jury trial waivers. Patients do not
view the relationship with their physician as being contractual. They see it as medicinal.
Furthermore, studies have shown that a very small percentage of consumers read
form agreements and only a few of those actualK understand what the}' read." Doubtless.
this is even more true in the context of a sick patient reading and signing numerous forms
in a doctor's office.
In 1997 the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association and
the American Medical Association formed a commission to study, and make
recommendations regarding, alternative dispute resolution of health care claims. The
Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution was made up of leaders of these three
organizations and issued a final report in 1998. Fhe Commission recognized that
alternative dispute resolution agreements between phvsicians and patients where different
than agreements between businesses and consumers in other settings:
The nature of the relationship between plans and patients or providers is
such that little, if any negotiation over terms - including external review or
ADR systems - takes place. Since these ADR systems or external review
procedures will invariably not be the product of a negotiated agreement, the
Commission believes it would be especially useful to set forth key aspects
oi'procedural due process, to ensure a "level playing field" for resolving
health care disputes by ADR.'
-See Alan M. White & Cathy 1,esser Mansfield. Literacy and ( 'oniruct, 13 Stan. F. <fc
Poi/V Rf.v. 233 (2002) (analv/ing literacy research that demonstrated a high percentage of
literate adults are incapable of extracting relevant information from form contracts); Todd I).
Rakoff. Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction. 96 Harv. E. Rf-:v. 1174. 1179
(1983) (discussing studies showing that consumers are unlikely to read adhesion contracts before
signing them and less likely to understand what they read).
'Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution. Final Report, July 27, 1998 at 14.
available at http:'''www.arna-assn.org/amal 'pub'uploadTnny'395 ''healthcare.pdf
7
One of the key procedural due process principles set forth by the commission was
that "in disputes involving patients, binding forms of dispute resolution should be used
onlv where the parties agree to do so after a dispute arises."4 Fhe recommendation to
only accept post-dispute agreements was one of only five unanimous recommendations of
the Commission. In response to this recommendation, lhe American Arbitration
Association announced that effective January 1. 2003, it would no longer accept cases
involving pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the health care area.'
Soon ihereafter. The Ameiican Health Law vers Association's Alternative Dispute
Resolution Service amended its rules and effective January 1. 2004. announced that it
would only administer arbitration agreements entered by parties after an injury occurred.6
These policies to administer only post-dispute agreements acknowledge the
inherent unfairness of asking patients to sign pre-dispute waivers and recognize the reality
that such waivers are in no wav knowinu. voluntarv or intelligent.
"'id. at 15 (emphasis added).
*American Arbitration Association. Health Can- Policy Statement, available at
Imp:/, vvwvv.adr.org/sp.asp7id 2 1885.
''American 1lealth Lawyers Association, About Arbitration and Medication Services:
Important Rules Amendment, available at
lHtp:/7vvvvvv.healthlavvyers.org/'l cmpiate.cfni /Section About Arbitration and Mediation Servic
es&'l emplate /ContcnlManagement''Conten[Display.cfm&CoiitentII) 3049.
8
IE Rescission Is Not The Answer For Patients.
Although the law allows patients to rescind arbitration agreements, this is a
toothless defense against doctors intent on perpetuating mandatory arbitration. Because
phvsicians are no longer required to give a verbal explanation of the nearly 1.200 word
agreements, manv patients likely do not even realize the} have the right to rescind them.
Those who do exercise this right, as allowed by law. ma} find their doctor coming up
with other excuses for refusing to treat them.
A recent newspaper article reported the story of Colleen Brunson. a victim of
illegal, mandator}' arbitration. Mrs. Brunson was required to sign an arbitration
agreement in September 2003. after the legislature allowed physicians to den}' treatment
to patients who refused to sign. In 2004 the legislature amended the law to prevent such
coercion, and Mrs. Brunson rescinded her agreement w ithin 5 days of when the new law-
took effect. Just three days later. Mrs. Brunson's physician sent her a letter saying he
would no longer be able to treat her "due to problems communicating" with her. After
seven vears of treating with the same doctor. Mrs. Brunson and her family were forced to
seek medical help elsewhere/
"Patients were allowed 30 days to rescind agreements under the 1999-2003 versions of the
act. I'nder the 2004 amendments, patients are allowed onl\ 10 days in which to rescind.
'Shane Johnson. Arbitration Frustrations: Doctors find creative ways to force patterns
into malpractice agreements despite I tub law. Salt Fake Citv Weekly; City Beat - July 8. 2004.
available at http: •'• www,si weekly.eonv'cditoriaP2004'city 2004-07-08.cfm.
9
C. The Supposed "Benefits" Of Arbitration In Other Contexts Do Not
Exist In The Health Care Setting.
Although Utah law favors "speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating
disputes.'"1' there is no evidence to suggest arbitration of medical malpractice claims falls
in this category.
Proponents of arbitration claim that one of its advantages is the reduced cost when
compared vvilh litigation. Ihiwever, they offer no evidence in support olThis claim and it
is difficult to conceive of how they could."1 Aware of this claimed "benefit" to
arbitration, lhe I Inited States General Accounting Office ("GAO") studied the costs of
arbitration versus litigation in Michigan's arbitration program and concluded that the
costs were virtually the same.1' In 1hah. medical malpractice arbitrations are conducted
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. All the deadlines and discover}' tools
permitted under the rules are utilized in arbitrations exactly as they would be in litigation.
Written discover}7 is propounded. Medical records arc collected and reviewed.
" Allrcd v. Hducators Mutual Ins. Ass n. of Utah. 909 ]\2d 1263. 1265 (Utah 1996).
'"Public Citizen. Congress Watch April 2002: The ('osts ofArbitration at. 61 (May I,
2002) ("there appears to be no report or studv finding that litigants, by giving up free use of a
public court system, can actually save money through private adjudication." And "a review of
the literature on arbitration finds no scholarly writing setting forth a theory behind claims oi'
arbitration cost savings'").
11 Medical Malpractice: Few <' 'luims Resolved Through Michigan 's I'oluntary Arbitration
Program. (GAO/HRD-91-3S. Dec. 27. 1990) (median defense costs were $17,509 for arbitration
and $17,798 for litigation).
10
Depositions are taken, F:\perts are retained. All of the costs incurred in traditional
litigation are. oi'necessity, incurred in arbitration. I lealth care providers in Utah
recognized this fact even in 2003 when the} were pushing for increased use of arbitration:
'Fhe patient and physician share the fees and expenses of the neutral
arbitrator, and each pays the fees and expenses of their chosen arbitrator.
1his is in addition to an}' attorney's fees incurred, which, for the patient.
can still be negotiated as a contingency fee. if attorney fees have
traditional!} been paid for by contingency (for the patient) and an insurance
eompanv (for the defendant), neither individual involved in arbitration
would find a savings or additional expense here. However, the arbitrators'
fees and expenses might represent new costs in this process.12
This added cost should not be casually dismissed. Arbitrators charge hourly Fees
that can range from $250 to $350 an hour. Not only do parties have to pay the hourl}' fee
of three arbitrators over the length of the arbitration hearing, but the}" must pa}" an
arbitrator for each hour that is spent acting as a judge and ruling on discover} disputes,
scheduling conferences, substantive motions, etc. Pven a "simple" medical malpractice
ease will incur thousands of dollars in arbitrator fees that would not be imposed on
litigants in a traditional civil action.
"This added exist alone may be enough to render arbitration agreements
unenforceable, fhe Supreme Court has recognized that "the existence of large arbitration
::Beverl\ Hawkins. Medical Arbitration Agrcments. Ml.DICAI. FTHK'S in I" IAlt.
December 2003. available at
http: • uuhsc.uiah.edu cthies/NcwsArchive'2003 •necembero(i202003°o20.pdf.
costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her .. . . rights in the arbitral
lorum."1' Other courts addressing this issue have also concluded that when arbitration
costs raise barriers to due process, the agreements should not be enforced.14
There is also no evidence that arbitration is faster than traditional litigation. As
noted above, because discovery in arbitration proceeds exactly as it does in atigation,
there is no reasonable explanation for how it could be faster. In fact, it was observed in
California that the average wait for an arbitration hearing was almost 30 months, while
96% id'eases in trial court were disposed of in less than 24 months.1'1
Another touted benefit of medical malpractice arbitration is that the process would
lower the cost of malpractice insurance and. in turn, help keep a lid on the rising cost of
r' Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph. 531 U.S. 79. 90 (2000).
l4Armendariz. v. Foundation Health Psvchcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687 (Cal. 2000)
(holding that when an emplovcr imposes mandator} arbitration as a condition of employment, the
arbitration process cannot impose expenses on the employee that he would not have to bear in
court): Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado. 163 F.3d 1230. 1235 (10th Cir.
1999) (an arbitration agreement requiring employee to pay one-half of arbitrator's fee placed
employee "between lhe proverbial rock and hard place - it prohibited use of the judicial forum,
where a litigant is not required to pay for a judge's services, and the prohibitive cost substantially
limited use ol"the arbitral forum"); Cole v. Hums Intern. Security Services. 105 F.3d 1465, i 484
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (court refused to compel arbitration and held that it was unacceptable to require
the plaintiff to pay arbitrator's lees "because such fees are unlike anything that he would have to
pay to pursue his statutory claims in court"); State F'x Rel. Dunlap v. Hergcr. 567 S.I*.2d 265
(Vv'.Va. 2002) (holding that provisions in contracts of adhesion that impose unreasonably
burdensome costs or that would have a deterrent effect upon a person seeking to vindicate rights
are unconscionable).
!' P'nualla v. Pennanente Medical Croup. Inc.. 938 P.2d 903, 987 (Cal. 1997) (Kcnnard, J.
concurring).
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health care. Although courts often defer such policy judgments to the legislature, when it
comes to medical malpractice arbitration, that deference should be tempered b\ reality. In
anah/ing the 2003 I 'tab Legislature's passage of the well-publicized mandatory
arbitration amendments of the Utah 1lealth Care Malpractice Act. one commentator noted
that representatives "gave inadequate consideration to the scope of the problem, the
causes of the problem, the proposed solution, and the impact of the bill on the public."1'1
The lack of adequate information results in legislators who are "forced to rely more and
more heavilv on information from lobbyists and colleagues, and when the time to vote on
a bill arrives, it has become common for a legislator to look to cither a member oi'
leadership or the gallery lor an indication of how to vote."1
Evidence in support of this commentary is found in the recordings of the debate on
the senate tloor for the 2003 amendments. It appears the legislature either misunderstood
or misrepresented facts which bore direct!} on their ability to engage in appropriate
legislative decision making with regard to the proposed changes to arbitration of medical
malpractice claims in I Tan:
Rep. Ferrin: I am looking at lines 105 through 108 and it would
appear to me that the substantive effect of this change
is that a patient may now be denied health care of any
"'Hrvson H. Morgan. Mandatory Medical Arbitration: 'The Wrong Answer to the Rising
Cost of Health Care in Utah. 6 1IlNCKU-Y Jot rnal oi- Poi I IKS at 44 (2005).
:Td. at 43.
kind on the sole basis that the patient or person refused
to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with the
health care provider. ... Is that the desired effect of the
bill?
Rep. Dayton: No. The desired effect of the bill is to allow two
parlies to negotiate together. Whether or not they will
agree to arbitration. Doesn't mean that all physicians
will want arbitration, it doesiTt mean everybody has to.
It just allows this because the way the law is now.
physicians are not permitted that arbitration option.
Rep. Ferrin: Hut am I mistaken that a patient under this change, a
patient may be denied health care of any kind on the
sole basis that they did not enter into an arbitration
agreement?
Rep. Dayton: No, because they can decide from there if they don't
want to enter into an arbitration agreement what to do
with their relationship from there. So. no they can't be
denied and there are other options.
^ ^f* 'T*
Rep. Christensen As a follow up to Representative Ferriivs question, am
1 correct in understanding at line 71h that 78-14-17
will be repealed in 2009 as it now currently is
codified?
Rep. Dayton: This docs have a six year sunset if that is what you are
asking.
Rep. Christensen Hut it specifically repeals 78-14-17 does it not?
Rep. Dayton: Correct.
Rep. Christensen And if you look at 78-14-17 sub paragraph 2. it
currently provides exactly what Representative Ferrin
14
was asking abotit. that a patient may not be denied
health care of an} kind on the sole basis that the patient
or a person described in subsection five refused to
enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a health
care provider. So that protection will both disappear
and be gone right?
Rep. Dayton: I he purpose of this bill is to allow arbitration as an
option which it is not an option right now. People
enter into business relationships every day. Whether or
not they choose to do so should be their decision. We
would never force a patient to go to a particular doctor
or even an attorney for someone against their will, but
what we are saying here is that what applies to other
business relationships can now apply to physicians
except in emergencies, and that is that they may have
the option of offering arbitration.18
Contrary to these troubling representations made during "debate" on the bill,
arbitration had long been available to physicians under the law in existence since 1999.
and under the proposed 2003 amemiments health care providers were permitted to refuse
treatment to unw illing patients. These excerpts make it clear that when it comes to public
policy behind medical malpractice arbitration, the legislature does not deserve the
deference it is accorded.
With regard to the stated goal that the 2003 amendments would help protect the
health care system, one of the chief sponsors of the bill. Senator Parley IlellewelF
;v2()()3GS House Floor Debate SH0138 - Day 45 (3 52003).available at
http:'. \vv\w.image, le.slate, ut.us'imaging'bill.asp.
reversed his position during the next legislative session and conceded that malpractice
lawsuits are not damaging die system and "doctors are not leaving the stale or quitting
their practices" as a result oi' lawsuits.1'' Fhis acknowledgment is in line with the fact that
of the 252.571 cases filed in I Itah District Courts in 2005. only 262 were medical
malpractice cases.2" Additionally, research has shown that "medical malpractice
premiums as a percent of health care costs have been steadily declining over the past
decade from .95 percent in 1988 to an estimated .57 percent in 2003.":| 'fort reform
rhetoric should no longer be a justification for unwarranted infringements on
constitutionally protected rights.
I). Arbitration Favors The "Repeat Player" Insurance Industry Over The
Individual Patient.
"A repeat player is an individual or organization who repeatedly interacts with a
particular institution or engages in certain behaviors, for example, commercial
transactions or dispute resolution.""""
'''Tony Kreindler. Sponsor of I tab Malpractice Arbitration Bill Now Wants Repeal,
ADRWorld.com, January 21, 2004. available at www.adrworld.com/sp.asp7id" 27131.
"" District Court Caseload FY2005 - Statewide Summary, available at
http:/Avww.utcourts.gov/stats/FY05/dist/fy2005 9.htm.
-''Hryson H. Morgan. Mandatory Medical Arbitration: The Wrong Answer to the Rising
Cost ofHealth. Fare in Utah. 6 1llNCKU VJOURNAL Of POLITICS at 45 (2005).
'Sarah Rudolph Cole. Incentives andArbitration: Hie Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees. 64 UMK.C F. RlV. at 452
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One of the inequities that results from this disparity in experience is that one-shot
players, such as patients, blindly sign arbitration agreements because they do not think it
will matter. I hey "improperly value the inclusion of the arbitration agreement" in their
physician-patient relationship. Patients "suffer from judgmental bias as a result of their
personal experiences. That is. they systematically ignore or de-emphasi/e the likelihood
that a low probability event will occur because the event has never affected them." 'I his
causes the patient to "misapprehend the risk" that they will engage in litigation with their
doctor."'
This problem is even more pronounced under the 2004 amendments to the act
because physicians are no longer required to give a verbal explanation of the jury trial
waiver. When patients find an arbitration agreement among the myriad of other forms
given to them in the waiting room of their physician's office it is simply unreasonable to
expect that they purposefully consider the remote possibility that the doctor will provide
negligent treatment that will result in serious life-threatening injuries or death. It is even
more unreasonable to assume the patient then makes an informed, thoughtful decision
that in the event of such a tragedy she would prefer to resolve the claim in a secret,
binding, unappealable forum unencumbered by the protections afforded her in the
996).
constitution. Simply put. patients eannol be expected to fully comprehend the
implications of signing pre-dispute jury trial waivers with their trusted physicians.
The insurance industry repeatedly attempts U> force arbitration on patients because
it is well understood that "the playing field in arbitration is tilted in favor of those wio
benefit most from it - corporate defendants.*'"1 As "repeal players." medical malpractice
insurers have advantages in arbitration proceedings that are not available to "one-shot"
participants like individual plaintiffs.
One such advantage is the secrecy of the proceedings. In reality, the secrecy s
only one-sided. While individual plaintiffs know nothing about prior arbitrations (e.g.
who the defendant was. who the defendant's attorney was. who the arbitrators were, what
the issues were, what the verdict was) the insurance carrier defendant has access to all
this information for every arbitration dealing with any of its insureds.
The repeat player's more sophisticated understanding of the dispute
resolution process -end his ability to influence that process through repeated
informal relations with the decision maker may also be advantageous.
Finally, the repeat player will be able to make use of his own "institutional
memory." The repeat player will be familiar with both the line of decisions
affecting his own workforce as well as those arbitrators who are likely to
render favorable decisions.2^
This institutional verdict reporting system gives the defendants an enormously
2,1 Dan I.aw ton. hair Shake? Arbitration Industry Has No Incentive to Reform A System
That Serves It Well, fos Angllls Daily Journal, July 24, 2002 at 6.
" Cole, supra note 22. at 4^3.
unfair advantage in the proceedings. Not only does secrecy shield plaintiffs from the
knowledge of precedent, but it also shields the public from the knowledge of potential
bad actors. Jurv verdicts in this country not only serve to compensate injured victims of
negligence, but they also serve to sound a warning cry to other potential wrongdoers. For
example, many of the safety standards we have come to expect from the automotive and
pharmaceutical industries came about as a result of juries sending a message that
negligence would not be tolerated.
Why do capitalist nations have publicly-supported courts systems if private
arbitrators can resolve disputes7 It is not because the public has an interest
in adjudicating individual disputes: it is because the very existence of a
court system induces voluntary compliance with contracts and respect for
rights of others.2'1
When negligent physicians and hospitals are permitted to "resolve" valid claims in
secret, unreportable. unappealable forums, society as a whole is worse off.
A further disadvantage imposed on the "one shot" patient in arbitration is that she
is unable to offer the decision makers the additional income that might arise from future
disputes.
And the fact that the business organization imposing the arbitration clause
is a repeat player in the arbitration system, while the consumer or employee
is not. raises the potential that arbitrators will consciously or unconsciously
26 Public Citizen. Congress Watch April 2002: The Costs ofArbitration at 74 (May
2002).
bias their decisions in favor of [lhe husiness] that hires them regularly.2'
"Fhe pool of qualified medical malpractice arbitrators in Utah is woefully shallow
and comprised of mostly "professional" arbitrators. Coincidenlally, the pool of
malpractice insurance companies operating in I hah is equally shallow, consisting of only-
two or three significant players. Fhis is a dangerous combination. Defendants seleel one
of the arbitrators on each three person panel and have veto power over a second. When
an arbitrator's livelihood is dependent upon the benevolence of an insurance carrier he
will be understandably reluctant to do anything that might make the carrier unhappy.
Simple logic would lead anyone to conclude that a plaintiffs verdict in arbitration would
make an insurance carrier quite unhappy. On the other hand, an arbitrator who rcpe; tedly
renders decisions in favor of defendant physicians will quickly find himself at the top of
the "preferred provider" list. 'Fhe bias is a tremendous advantage to the defendants, and
whether such bias occurs consciously or unconsciously is of little importance to the
individual plaintiff left without recourse for his injuries. When it comes to income for
arbitrators, a la carte plaintiffs simply cannot compete with the all-you-caii-eat buffet
offered by the defense.
Due to the secrecy of arbitration proceedings in Utah it is impossible to compile
27 Fnualla v, Permanenle Medical (Jump. Inc., 938 P.2d 903. 988 (Cat. 1997) (Kcnnard, J.
concurring).
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statistics regarding the outcomes of hearings. However, in 2003. legal counsel for the
I 'tab Medical Insurance Association. Flliott Williams, stated that he had been involved in
nine arbitration proceedings and all nine decisions were in favor of the physieians.~s
Although plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases nationally win twenty-seven
percent of the time in state courts2'' and thirty-seven percent of the lime in federal court.""'
injured patients forced to arbitrate their claims in Utah have a ()°o success rate according
to Mr. Williams.
Given these advantages, it is little wonder the insurance industry favors arbitration
over jury trials. 1lowever. these same advantages should cause this Court to ask pointed
questions regarding the fairness and constitutionality of pre-dispute jury trial waivers in
the health care setting:
Where judges are prov ided free (through taxes) in court, parties are paying
time and expenses for a panel in arbitration at a rate far higher than we pay
our judges. What are we saying about our confidence in the judiciary we
elect and or appoint that we are unw illing to allow them to determine cases
ev en in a bench tria 17 Is the quality of private decision makers worth
making clients pay so much more? If arbitration is not a reflection on our
judiciary, then is it an attempt to escape laws? Are corporations adding
Mames R. Ilolbrook. Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims in
Utah. Utah Bar Journal. October 2003. at 10.
""U.S. Department of Justice. Civil Justice Survey of State Courts. 2001: Medical
Malpractice Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties. 2001.
" U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Justice Statistics Program; Federal Tort Trials and
Verdicts. 2002-2003.
arbitration clauses to every contract to escape the rules of evidence,
procedure and even the substantive law? Surely we are not paying for an
entire replacement system just to avoid the occasional jury trial?
Isn't something amiss when the law. the courts, and juries still exist, but all the cases have
been moved elsewhere?'1
'Fhe physician-patient relationship should be about health care and not about
contracts. There is unequal bargaining power between the parties and the nature of the
relationship prevents any reasonable opportunity for a meeting of the minds on complex
jury trial waiver issues.
II. THERE IS NO PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING UNKNOWING,
INVOLUNTARY, UNINTELLIGENT WAIVERS OF A NON-PARTY'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
"[W|hile the public policy of promoting speedy and inexpensive resolution of
controversies favors arbitration in some cases, these considerations eannoi outweigh the
constitutional right of access to the courts unless one waives that right." ^
Article I. Section 10 of the I hah Constitution guarantees civil litigants the right to
a trial by jury." This substantive right is integral lo our state and federal systems of
justice. Although parties are free to waive their constitutional right to a trial by jury.
31 Tracy Walters Melormack. Privatizing the Justice System. Ri:v i;w oi I.i I'lGA'l l()\;
Symposium 2006. Vol.25:4 at 735.
32 Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 706, 800 (Utah 1998).
" Sec. Intern. Harvester (Tec.it v. Pioneer Tractor. 626 P.2d 418. 421 (Hiah 1981).
courts have an obligation to ensure that any such waiver is spotless from the stains of
fraud, coercion, or ignorance. The Court's role as protector of this fundamental right has
been repeatedly emphasized by the United States Supreme Court:
The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always been
an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it
has been watched with great jealousy/"1
Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding bod}' is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeing
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care/"
I he right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative oi" force. In an
organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at
the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most
essential privileges of citizenship/"
Because this right is a "jealously guarded privilege under the Constitution."" this
Court has held that any jury trial waiver must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent/'
Fisa Bybee was not a party to the arbitration agreement at issue in the present case,
and it is impossible to conclude that she made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver
''"Chauffeurs. Teamsters & Helpers. Focal No. -91 v. Terry. 494 U.S. 558. 581 (1990
"'T)imick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474. 486 (1935).
'"•'Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.. 207 U.S. 142. 148 (1907).
"State v. Hassan. 108 P.3d 695. 698 (Utah 2004).
"'Jenkins. 962 P.2d at 799.
of her right to a jury trial with regard lo her wrongful death claims.
Amicus Curiae I Tali Medical Association argues there is a federal and state policy
favoring arbitration. I lowever, it is welFaccepted lhat this "favored" status does nol
extend to dragging non-parlies into arbitration and only comes into play after establishing
a valid agreement between lhe parties. This Court has recognized thai any policy
Favoring arbitration docs not trump contractual requirements or constitutional protections:
Judicial promotion of alternative methods of dispute resolution is not the
sole consideration, however. When parties agree to arbitrate, they waive
the substantial right to judicial resolution of their disputes. Consequently,
the policy ofliberally construing agreements in favor or arbitration is
conditioned upon the prior determination that arbitration is a remedy freely
bargained for by the parties and which provides a means of giving effect lo
the intention of the parties.w
This Court addressed lhe issue of binding non-parties to arbitration in Jenkins v.
Pcrcival."':: and after stating that "the right to apply to the courts for relief for the
perpetration of a wrong is a substantial right and cannot be waived through contract
except in the most unequivocal terms." held that a non-signatory insured could not be
bound by an arbitration agreemert between his insurance company and a lort plaintiff. In
:'9McCovv. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 220 P.3d 90U 904 (Utah 2001)
(citations omitted). See also. In Re Kepka. 178 SAY.3d 279. 286 (I ex. App. - I Ioiiston | P Dist]
2005) ("this federal policy favoring arbitration does nol apply to the determination of whether
there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties . . . [and) the federal policy favoring
arbitration does not extend lo a determination of who is bound").
4(1 962 P.2d 796. 799(1998).
the view of the Jenkins Court, the open courts pro\ ision of the Utah Constitution. Article
1. Section 11. prohibited depriving a litigant of his da} in court without an express
agreement.
"Fhe reality is that any policy "lav oring" arbitration came about in an ciYorl to place
arbitration agreements "upon the same fooling as other contracts."41 and not lo raise
alternative dispute resolution above a litigant's constitutional right to a jury trial. While
policy favoring arbitration should be used to allow parties to an agreement the
opportunity to resolve a dispute in an alternative forum if they so choose, it should not be
used to allow a party who desires alternative dispute resolution the power to unilaterally
force arbitration on a non-signatory. 1he principle that parties cannot be compelled to
arbitrate claims unless they have agreed lo do so was succinctly stated by the Utah Court
of Appeals as follows:
Arbitration is a matter ol"contract and a party cannot be required to submit
to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to so submit. 'Fhis is
because a party who has nol agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to
a court's decision about the merits of its dispute. Thus, although there is a
presumption in favor of arbitration, a party will not be required to arbitrate
when it has not agreed to do so. We must First conclude that arbitration is a
remedy which has been bargained for by the parties. Only when such
agreement on arbitration exists may we encourage arbitration by liberal
interpretation of the arbitration provisions themselves.42
; Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc. v. Bvrd. 470 U.S. 213. 219(1985).
-'-'- Cade v. /ions First National Bank. 956 P.2d 1073. 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
I his position is consistent with numerous other jurisdictions that refuse to force
non-signatories intoa forum they did not. chose.43 As a non-signatory to the agreement,
Mrs. By bee cannot be compelled lo arbitrate her claims.
A. Mrs. Bybee Could Not Make A Knowing, Voluntary And Intelligent
Waiver Of A Right That Did Not Exist At The Time The Agreement
Was Entered.
Mrs. Bybee could not have waived, nor could her husband have waived on her
behalf, her constitutional right to a jury trial of her wrongful death claims because the
claims did not exist at the lime her husband signed lhe agreement. In Utah, "in order for
waiver to occur, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it."44 As noted in Behm v. Gee {In re Behm's
iisJilleJ,0 a wrongful death cause of action "only comes into existence upon the happening
,: Cook's Pest Control. Inc. v. Hovkin. 807 So.2d 524. 526 (Ala. 2001) ("it is the general
rule that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot be forced to arbitrate her claims"'); In
re Big 8 food Stores. Ltd.. 166 S,W.3d 869. 876 (Tex. App. Id Paso 2005) ("a party seeking to
enforce a purported arbitration agreement must establish that the parties agreed to arbitrate the
dispute"); Riverside Capital Advisors. Inc. v. Winchester Global 'I rust Co. Ltd.. 21 A.I).3d 887
(N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 2005) ("it is well settled that a party may not be compelled to arbitrate a
dispute unless there is evidence which affirmatively establishes that the parties clearly, explicitly,
and unequivocally agreed io arbitrate the dispute""); Scnmgs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co..
62 P.3d 989 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2003) ("parties are only bound to arbitrate those issues which by-
clear language they have agreed lo arbitrate; arbitration agreements will not be extended by
construction or implication"); Jackson Stale Bank v. Ilomar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Wyo. 1992)
("no party is required to arbitrate a dispute unless the parties have bargained for this procedure as
a method of resolve'").
44 Mont. Trucking Inc. v. Fnlrada Indus.. Inc.. 802 P.2d 799. 781 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
'"117 Utah 151,158. 213 P.2d 657 (1950).
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of death." Because a wrongful death claim is an independent action accruing in the heirs
of the deceased.46 and because a person's heirs are not defined until the time of death,4'
Mrs. Bv bee's wrongful death cause of action did not exist at the time her husband
purportedly waived her right to litigate the claim.
As this Court stated in McCoy.4S "waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right." Because the cause of action did not exist at the time her husband signed
the agreement it would be impossible for Mrs. Bybee to have intentionally relinquished
that right.
B. Mr. Bybee's Intentions With Regard To Binding His Heirs Are
Irrelevant.
Generally, the obligation of contracts is limited to the parties making them
. . . Parties to a contract cannot thereby impose any liability' on one who.
under its terms, is a stranger to the contract. ... In the case of a written
contract, a person who is not named in. or bound by, the terms of a written
contract cannot be rendered liable on it by a mere intention that he or she
should be bound[.]49
Defendant's amicus argues that Mr. Bybee intended to bind his heirs to the
arbitration agreement and that his intentions should be controlling. Such a position
4' Jensen v. IHC Hospital. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997).
4 See. Gershon v. Regency Diving Center. Inc.. 368 N.J. Super. 237 (2004).
4S20P.3dat905
4"17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 412.
ignores this Court's recognition that "a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has nol agreed so to submit.*'50 Further, it ignores the fact that Mr.
Bybee lacked the capacity to bind his statutory heirs with regard to a new cause of action.
'Fhis Court has previously explained that it is the statutory intent, and not the decedent's
wishes, that is controlling in wrongful death cases.51
Wrongful death heirs are essentially third parties to a relationship that existed
between the decedent and the tortfeasor. The Utah Wrongful Death Act exists toprotect
the rights of these third parties to recover for their injuries. Utah courts have consistently
held that ordinary contract principles that might bind non-consenting third parties in the
context of common law claims arc not applicable to statutorily created causes of action
designed to protect persons designated in the statute.52
•u Central Florida Investments. Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 604 (Utah
2002).
51 See, Kelson v. Salt Fake County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989).
"See, Metals Manuf. Co. v. Bank of Commerce. 395 P.2d 914 (Utah 1964) (holding that
the contractually manifested intentions of the Lessorand Lessee could no: bind third party
suppliers who were not privies to the agreement where enforcing the agreement would
circumvent a statute whose purpose is to protect suppliers); John Wagner Associates v. Hercules.
]nc;:797P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990). cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991) (refusing to
enforce parties intentions on third party protected by the mechanics lien statute); (Camp v.
Officesof Recovery Services of Utah Dcpl. Of Social Services. 779 P.2d 242 (Utah App. 1989)
(Medicaid not bound by agreement made by recipient in wrongful death case and can recover in
full if recipient proceeds without State's consent); State Rx Rel. Dunlap v. Berger. 211 W. Va.
549, 599, 567 S.R.2d 265 (2002) ("we recognize and hold that exculpatory provisions in a
contract of adhesion that if applied would prohibit or substantially limit a person from enforcing
and vindicating rights and protections or from seeking and obtaining statutory or common-law
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III. THE 2004 AMENDMENTS TO § 78-14-17 DO NOT REQUIRE
WRONGFUL DEATH HEIRS TO SUBMIT THEIR CLAIMS TO
ARBITRATION.
Fhe Utah Medical Association argues that the current version of ij 78-14-17
specifically prov idcs that non-party heirs can be bound by arbitration agreements signed
by their decedents. Fhis is not true. Subparagraph (1 )(b)(vii) provides that agreements
shall only apply to:
(B) the claim of:
(I) a person who signed the agreement:
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed tinder
Subsection (6): and
(III) the unborn child of the person described. . . : and
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis
for the chum is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection
(l)(b)(vii)(N):"
The sole basis for Mrs. Bybec's claims are not the injuries sustained bv her
husband, they are her own. individual injuries.
A. A Wrongful Death Action Belongs To The Heirs And Is Distinct From
Any Claims Of The Decedent.
This Court reiterated in In re Behm's 1•state/"1 that a wrongful death claim is
independent from the injuries suffered by the decedent:
relief and remedies that are afforded by or arise under state law that exists for the benefit and
protection of the public are unconscionable"').
" Utah Code Ann. s' 78-14-17 (2004) (emphasis added).
i; 117 Utah at 158.
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[A] claim for death is a separate and independent cause of action and is not
a continuation of the right of action of the injured parly for personal
injuries. Fhe death creates a new cause of action for the loss suffered by
the heirs by reason of death, and only comes into existence upon the
happening of death/"
Thus, the "sole basis" for Mrs. Bybee's claims is not the injuries suffered by her
deceased husband, but the individual injuries she suffered as a result of her husband's
death. The injuries suffered by Mrs. Bybee are the loss of support, affection, counsel,
care, comfort and pleasure her husband would have provided, but for his wrongful
death/"
Mrs. Bybee does not represent the estate of her husband in this action. I ler claims
arc based on Utah's Wrongful Death Act and she is bringing the claims as a statutorv heir.
Because an "action for wrongful death is an independent action accruing in the heirs of
the deceased.""'7 the amendments to JJ 78-14-17 do not compel Mrs. Bybee to arbitrate her
statutory claims against the defendant.
Il is argued that because courts have not "entirely separated the heir's right from
the decedent's.""'' the decedent slmuld be permitted to waive his wife's constitutional
" (Citing Van Wauoner v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.. 112 Utah 189 (1947);
•"See. Id. at159.
'7 Jensen v. IHC Ilospital. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327. 332 (Utah 1997).
'* Id.
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right to a jury trial of her statutorily created wrongful death claims. This argument would
render meaningless the difference between common law personal injury claims and
statutorv wrongful death claims. However, it is because of the difference in these two
types of claims that the Utah Wrongful Death Act was passed in the first place."" Prior to
the creation of this statutory cause of action a wife could not sue for the wrongful death of
her husband. Also worthy of note is the fact that "at common law. an action for personal
injury abates upon the death of the person injured." and a decedent's common law heirs,
such as his wife, could not stiececd to the husband's cause of action.611 Although a
common law personal injury claim and a statutory wrongful death claim may derive front
the same acts of negligence by a physician, the two actions serve distinct ptirposes and the
wrongful death claims are not legally derivative of the personal injury claims. "Fhe
wrongful death claim •"derives from the wrongful act causing the death, rather than from
the person of the deceased.""1
Additionally, if the arbitration provisions of the statute were construed as the other
side suggests, it would raise serious constitutional questions because it would deny Mrs.
M| "The Utah wrongful death act was originally passed by the Territorial Legislature in
1874 to remedy the harsh effects of the common law rule which did not recogni/c wrongful death
actions at all." Behrens v, kalcmh Hills IIosp.. Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179. 1184 (Utah 1983).
' Hailing v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 263 P. 78. 79 (Utah 1927).
"' Hull v. Silver. 577 P.2d 103. 106 (Utah 1978).
Bybee her conslittiiional right to ajury trial without due process and may violate the open
courts provision of the 1Jtah Constitution. Fhis Court has staled that statutes should be
construed so as lo avoid constitutional problems.61
Fhus. although Mr. Bybee may have consented to arbitrate his common law-
personal injury claims against Dr. Abdulla. he was powerless to prohibit his statutory
heirs from litigating their statutory claims in the forum oflheir choosing.
B. Not All Delenses Are Available To Wrongful Death Defendants.
Because a wrongful death cause of action is subject lo some of the defenses that
could have been asserted against the deceased/1' defendant's amicus wrongly assumes
that such claims arc subject to all possible defenses. Fhis Court rejected such an
argument in Hull v. Silver61 and held that some defenses, such as those based upon
personal disability to sue. were not available to a wrongful death defendant. The
categories of defenses Found by the Court to be available included those "which inhere in
the tort, or which are based upon decedent" s course of conduct after the injury and before
(,:See. Mountain Slates Tel. <N: Tel Co.. v. Payne. 782 P.2d 464. 467 (Utah 1989) ("a final
reason for our construction of [the statute] is that it avoids lhe due process challenge upon which
appellant relies. II there are alternative statutory constructions possible, one rendering a statute
constitutional and the other unconsli.utional. the former should be adopted.").
""'Jensen v. IIIC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327. 332 (Utah 1997).
M577P.2d 103, 105(Ulah 1978).
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death."""
Fhe defense of comparative negligence, permitted in Kelson v. Salt Fake County.'6
falls under the first category because, as the Kelson Court noted, the decedent's
contributory negligence goes to the question of whether or not his death was "wrongful"
under the terms of the statute/7 Such a defense "inhere|s| in lhe tort" and is justifiably
available to the defendant.
Additionally, the statute of limitations defense permitted in Jensen v. II1C
Ilospitals. lnc/s is based on the fact that it was the "decedent's course of conduct after the
injury and before death" that justified a ilnding that it would be "inequitable to recognize
a cause of action for wrongful death."'11* Allowing a stattite of limitations defense to be
asserted against the heirs where a patient is aware of an injury and chooses lo allow the
stattite of limitations to run prior to
his death should be read as an extension of the "one action rule" rather than a quest to
limit the rights of statutory wrongful death heirs.
"'Hull- ^77 P.2d at 105.
'"784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1998).
'' Kelson. 784 P.2d at 1155 ("alter the passage of the comparative negligence legislation,
thai wrongfulness standard was whether the victim, had he or she survived, would have been
barred from recovery in whole or in part under the provisions of section 78-27-37").
"944 P.2d at 332-333.
In brief, this Court's prior holdings that some defenses are available lo wrongful
death defendants should not be intcrpreled to mean thai all defenses are available. While
Mr. Bybee may have been the "master ol his own claim."''" he was not the master of the
forum in which his wife could assert her own personal claims.
C. How Can The Law Give Non-Signatory Defendants The Option Of
Joining Arbitration On The One Hand, But Require Non-Signatory
Plaintiffs To Join On The Other?
Article 3. paragraph 3 of the Arbitration Agreement provides that:
The parties consent to lhe participation in this arbitration of any person or
entity that would otherwise be a proper additional party in a court action
and which agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing
court action against such additional person or entity shall be slaved upon
agreement to participate in the arbitration.
This "piggy-back" provision is contained in virtually every health care arbitration
agreement and gives other health care providers, who were non-signatories to the
agreement, the option of joining the arbitration after a dispute arises. What makes this
paragraph notcworlhy is that while it gives other defendants the option of joining, it does
not require them to do so. It specifically requires an "agreement to participate in the
arbitration" before any non-signatory defendant can be bound by the decision.
If the insurance industry had their way in enforcing such inequitable agreements.
the absurd result would be that wrongful death plaintiffs could be arbitrating claims
7,1 id. at 322.
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against defendants pursuant to an agreement to which neither of them were parties. An
important distinction being that the defendants elected to be in the forum while the
plaintiffs were dragged there against their will. Basic contract principles would prevent
this outcome in virtually every setting imaginable.
This Court should not enforce such an inherently unfair agreement. If arbitration
is truly an "alternative" method of dispute resolution, it should be an "alternative" for
both parties, not just the physician.
IV. THE DECISIONS CITED BY DMA FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS ARE
EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT CASE AND OUGHT
NOT GUIDE THIS COURT.
Amicus Curiae Utah Medical Association asserts that courts in others jurisdictions
are routinely enforcing arbitration agreements against non-signatory wrongful death heirs.
A review of the cases cited reveals important factual and legal differences between those
cases and the one presently before this Court.
Although the Colorado Supreme Court in Allen v. Pacheeo71 held that "a non-party
may fall within the scope of the agreement." the Court made no effort to analyze the
implications of the state's wrongful death act and simply relied on the terms of the
agreement. 'Fhe Court gave nearly reverential treatment to the intentions of the signatory
parties without bothering to determine if the statute izave effect to such intentions. The
1 P.3d375. 381 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), cert denied. 2004 WL 324431 (U.S. 2004;
Allen decision should also be viewed in lhe context of Colorado's hostility toward
wrongful death actions, which this Court recognized in Rhoades v. Wright.7' In
comparing Colorado law with Utah law in this area, the Rhoades Court noted that unlike
Colorado's scheme, "our wrongful death act. places no limitation on recovery, allowing
for such damages as under all the circumstances of the case may be just. Again, our
statutory approach to the problem evidences a strong public policy against limitations
being placed on damages.""
Colorado also lacks lhe constitutional protections afforded wrongful death
claimants tinder Article XVI. § 5 of the I hah Constitution. Such protections were
described by this Court as existing "to prevent the abolition of the right of action for a
wrongful death, whether in a wholesale or piecemeal fashion/'74
The California Court of Appeals case. Mormile v. Sinclair.'' is easily
distinguishable from the present case in thai it did not involve a wrongful death claim.
Fhe court merely held that a husband's loss of consortium claim, which is derivative of
the wife's claim and based on the wife's physical injuries, was subject to the arbitration
72 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980).
7t Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
74 BenT bv and throimh Rertv v. Ikvch Aircraft Corn.. 717 P.2d 670. 684 (Utah 1985
^citations omitted).
75 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 (Cal. 11. App. 1994).
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agreement signed by the wife. In I itah. wrongful death claims arc not derivative.
More lo the point is the later California case of Buekner v. Tamarin '" where the
California Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's denial of a motion to compel
arbitration against wrongful death heirs. 'Fhe court reasoned that the patient had entered
into the arbitration agreement solely for his own medical care, he was not the agent of his
heirs, and "he therefore lacked the authority to waive their right to a jury trial of their
claims." "
Defendant also cites the case of Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital. *which is
distinguishable from the present ease in that, unlike the arbitration provisions of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act. the Michigan statute specifically permitted the arbitration of
claims "arising out of. . . the death of a person." '"' The Michigan court also examined the
state's wrongful death statute and. unlike Utah courts, determined that an "action brought
by lhe personal representative is a derivative one. and the representative in effect stands
in the shoes of the decedent." As discussed above, this is in direct contrast to the law in
I hah. which holds that a wrongful death claim is not derivative and heirs do not step into
98 Cal. App. 4th 140. 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
kFat 143.
119. Mich. App. 814. 327 NAY.2d 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
M. at 817.
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the shoes of their decedents.
Jansen v. Salomon Smith Harney. Inc.s" is easily distinguishable in that the court
noted that non-parties can be bound by agreements if they were agents of the signatory or
a third parly beneficiary to the agreement. "Fhe court also determined the beneficiaries'
claims were "derivative of the decedent's rights." and therefore, the non-signatories were
bound.81
As with Jansen. none of the other securities cases cited by Utah Medical
Association from other jurisdictions do anything to illuminate the issues presently before
this Court. The securities cases deal with third-party beneficiaries who were successors
to the contractual rights of their decedents. In I 'tab. statutory wrongful death claimants
are not successors to the rights of the decedent, they are asserting statutory claims that did
nol exist prior to the death of their loved one.
More instructive is the Texas case of In Re Kepka.82 where the appellate court
reversed the :rial court's order compelling a wrongful death heir to arbitrate her claims
pursuant to her decedent's agreement with a health care provider. Mrs. Kepka admitted
her husband to a nursing home and. as part of the admission documents, signed an
^ 776 A.2d816(NJ. Super. App. Div. 2001).
MId. at 258.
82178 SAY.3d 279 (lex. App. - Houston [U Distj 2005).
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arbitration agreement on her husband's behalf as his legal representative. After his
wrongful death. Mrs. Kepka filed suit and the defendant nursing home sought to compel
arbitration in accordance with the agreement. The court found that Mrs. Kepka had only-
signed the agreement on behalf of her husband and had not agreed to arbitrate any claims
she might have herself. 'Fhe court went on to enumerate six contract and agency theories
used to bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements^1 and concluded that none of the
theories applied. Finding that because Mrs. Kepka "did not sign the arbitration agreement
in her individual capacity and because her wrongful-death claim was necessarily brought
in her individual capacity for damages personal to her." the court held that it was an abuse
of discretion to order her individual wrongful death claim to arbitration.84 Interestingly,
the Kepka court took the opportunity to discuss the recent Colorado Pacheco case, which
is relied on by defendant's amicus, and correctly pointed out the problems with the
Colorado decision:
The Pacheco court's holding blends together the determination of what
claims fall within an agreement's scope and the determination of who can be
bound by the agreement. Our state supreme court has held that the
presumptions and strong policy favoring arbitration have no application
until after the movant has shown the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement.
8-'(l) incorporation by reference: (2) assumption; (3) agency: (4) alter ego; (5) equitable
estoppel: and (6) third-party beneficiary. In Re Kepka. 178 S.\V.3d at 293.
84 Id. at 294.
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Part of the burden of showing a valid arbitration agreement's existence is showing that the
entity against whom the movant seeks enforcement is cither a party to the agreement or a
non-party who may nonetheless have the agreement enforced against it. "A party cannot
be required to arbitrate unless it Fas agreed to do so." Accordingly, Texas courts would
not apply the favorable-to-arbitralion presumption that the Pacheco court applied to
resolve an ambiguity about which non-signatories were bound by the arbitration
agreement.s>
In Ciaccio v. Ca/avoux.86 Mrs. Ciaccio signed an arbitration agreement prior to
receiving obstetrical care related Lo her pregnancy. After her twin babies died shortly
after birth, she and her husband fled wrongful death actions against the physician. The
appellate court concluded that although Mrs. Ciaccio's claims were subject to the
arbitration agreement she signed, the claims of her husband were not. He had not signed
the agreement, nor had anyone signed on his behalf, and the court refused to compel him
to arbitrate his claims.
In Gcrshon v. Regency Diving Center. Inc..87 it was held that a release signed by
the decedent with the express purpose of barring his potential heirs from instituting a
wrongful death action in the event of his death did not legally extinguish the heir's rights
because they were not parlies to the agreement. The Court determined that '"the public
policy underpinning the Wrongful Death Act requires that we narrowly construe any
85 ]d. at 295 (citations omitted).
86 519 So.2d 799 (La. App. 1Cir. 1987).
87 368 N.J. Super. 237(2004).
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attempt to contractually limit . . . recovery."'
Courts from other jurisdictions which view wrongful death claims in a similar
manner as I tah courts have held that non-signatory wrongful death heirs cannot be bound
by arbitration agreements.
V. FORCING NON-SIGNATORY HEIRS INTO ARBITRATION IS NOT THE
ANSWER TO ANY POTENTIAL FOR ANOMALOUS RESULTS WHEN
EOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS ARE ASSERTED.
Utah Medical Association argues that if non-signatory wrongful death heirs cannot
be bound by arbitration agreements, then the next sign of the apocalypse is that
consortium claims and stirvival claims of non-signatories may also be exempt from such
agreements and require dual litigation in district court. This issue is not currently before
the Court. Unlike wrongful death claims, loss of consortium claims and survival claims
are derivative claims and argtiably within the scope of the amended statute. Whether they
are subject to arbitration is a question for another day and should not influence the
Court's decision on the issue before it.
However, it should be noted that the problem id"dual litigation already exists
under the current state of the law. Many malpractice cases involve claims against
physicians as well as the hospitals in which they practice. Most hospitals in Utah refuse
to participate in arbitration, requiring the plaintiff to 111c a parallel suit in district court.
" Id. at 247.
'1 his problem is routinely and easily addressed by a stipulation in which all parties agree
to joint discovery. Because lhe discovery process is identical in both actions, there is no
prejudice lo either party. It is well-understood that most cases, in arbitration and
litigation, settle during the discov cry period, so the potential for two separate "(rials" is
remote al best.
Additionally, although defendant's amicus expresses a fear of dual actions if
derivative claims arc litigated separately from other claims, il offers no justification for
why a non-signatory's constitutional right to a jury trial should be sacrificed on the altar
of judicial economy.
VI. THE ANSWER TO ALL CONCERNS ABOUT JURY TRIAL WAIVERS IS
TO ALLOW POST-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS.
In Allrcd v. Educators Mutual Ins. Assoc.89 this Court slated that lhe Utah
Arbitralion Act supported arbitration of bolh past and future disputes. 1lowever, much of
lhe law on arbitration, including the Allrcd decision, was developed prior to the
proliferation of arbitration agreements in the health care setting. As discussed above, the
physician-patient relationship is based on a higher level of trust and dependence than
exists in other contexts where arbitration is routinely favored. It is unrealistic to compare
the physician-patient relationship with that of bank-creditor, business-business, cmploycr-
'"%9P.2d 1263. 1265 (Utah 1996).
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employee or broker-investor. The physician-patient relationship is nol about money. It is
about healing. A procedure that may be fair and etfective in righting financial wrongs is
not necessarily fair and effective in dealing with the wrongful death of a loved one.
Additionally, pre-dispute jury trial waivers are losing favor. Georgia. Maine.
Washington and Texas have all passed laws prohibiting pre-dispute mandatory
arbitrations against health care plans/" As noted above, many groups that administer
arbitrations, including the American Arbitration Association and 'Fhe American 1lealth
1awvers Association's Alternative Dispute Resolution Serv ice. will no longer accept
cases involving pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the health care area.
However, if arbitration truly is a better way for resolving disputes then there is no
reason to suspect that natural forces will not lead patients and physicians to agree to
arbitration after a dispute arises. If there is a procedure for resolving disputes that really
is faster, cheaper and fairer then all parties would be wise to sit down and consider it. By
evaluating the pros and cons of all dispute resolution methods, in conjunction with the
particular facts of their case, both plaintiffs and defendants can make a truly informed
decision about the terms under which they may choose to arbitrate. An truly informed
decision is simply not possible with pre-dispute waivers:
" 'Bob Carlson. First Business, Now Health ('are: Signing Away One 's Right To Sue.
Managed Carl. June 2002. available at
http: wvvu .manacedearemay.conv'arehives'0206 O206.hinding.html.
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There is a tremendous difference between arbitration agreements that bind
""one shot" litigants and those that are entered into by more sophisticated
parties. A pre-dispute "agreement" to arbitrate cannot be truly knowing and
voluntary, because the one-shot player does not contemplate the
consequences of.submitting a hypothetical, yel-to-arise claim lo arbitralion.
He will nol be familiar with the costs of arbitration relative to ordinary
court costs. Ile also will not be in a position to shop among arbitration
provider organizations, or for individual arbitrators, at the time he
subscribes lo lhe clause. 1here is thus no opportunity to find affordable
arbitration services
The option of post-dispute arbitration, on the other hand, can be of
tremendous benefit to bolh parlies. Both parlies evaluate whether the
unique characteristics of arbitralion. such as expertise or confidentiality,
provide benefits that outweigh the increased forum costs/'1
There is nothing thai prevents patients and physicians from entering arbitralion
agreements after a dispute arises. If wrongful death heirs, such as Mrs. Bybee. sign .1
post-injury agreement lo arbitrate there will be no concern about whether the jury trial
waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
CONCLUSION
Pre-dispute arbitration agreements are disfavored in the health care setting, and
public policy docs not favor jury trial waivers thai are unknowing, involuntary and
unintelligent. Utah law docs not nermit decedents to bind their non-signatory heirs t/>
arbitration agreements. Arbitration should be voluntary, nol compulsory.
'"Public Citizen, Congress Watch April 2002: The Costs ofArbitration al 74 (May
2002).
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DATED this %C dav of October, 2006.
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